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The contemporary theory of epistemic democracy often draws on the
Condorcet Jury Theorem to formally justify the ‘wisdom of crowds’. But this
theorem is inapplicable in its current form, since one of its premises – voter
independence – is notoriously violated. This premise carries responsibility
for the theorem’s misleading conclusion that ‘large crowds are infallible’. We
prove a more useful jury theorem: under defensible premises, ‘large crowds
are fallible but better than small groups’. This theorem rehabilitates the
importance of deliberation and education, which appear inessential in the
classical jury framework. Our theorem is related to Ladha’s (1993) seminal
jury theorem for interchangeable (‘indistinguishable’) voters based on de
Finetti’s Theorem. We also prove a more general and simpler such jury
theorem.
Helpful comments were gratefully received from anonymous referees and the editor.
We also particularly thank Christian List for providing very useful feedback. We further
benefited from many great comments received from audiences at occasions where this
paper was presented, including the LSE Choice Group Seminar (LSE, UK, October 2010), the
Judgment Aggregation Workshop (CERSES & IHPST & HEC, Paris, France, January 2011),
the conference The Epistemic Life of Groups (Institute of Philosophy, London, UK, March
2011), the ECPR Joint Session workshop Frontiers of Deliberation (St. Gallen, April 2011), the
Third Rationality and Decision Network Meeting (LSE, UK, June 2011), the Decisions, Games
and Logic Workshop (Maastricht University, Netherlands, June 2011), the workshop New
Developments in Judgment Aggregation and Voting Theory (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology,
Germany, September 2011), and the Microeconomics Seminar (Hamburg University, January
2012).
1 Kai Spiekermann would like to emphasize that the formal results in this paper are the work
of Franz Dietrich.
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The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) looks back on a remarkable career.
Discovered by Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, in 1785, first
proved formally by Laplace in 1812 (Ben-Yashar and Paroush 2007: 190),
then long forgotten and finally rediscovered by Duncan Black (Black
1958, Grofman and Feld 1988), the CJT has now taken centre stage in
epistemic conceptions of democracy and in debates in social epistemology.
Propelled by claims in the popular literature that crowds can be ‘wise’
(Surowiecki 2004) and mobs ‘smart’ (Rheingold 2002), the CJT is now
again widely discussed across various disciplines, even beyond academic
circles. This career is surprising for a theorem that – in its basic form and
applied naively – rests on implausible premises and leads to implausible
conclusions, as we will show.
Roughly speaking, the CJT arrives at two conclusions concerning
a group decision between two alternatives, where one alternative is
objectively correct or better. First, the larger the group gets, the more likely
is a correct majority decision. This is the CJT’s non-asymptotic conclusion.
Second, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to one as
the group size tends to infinity. This is the CJT’s asymptotic conclusion.
Put roughly: larger groups make better decisions, and very large groups
are infallible. It is worth reflecting on these results. While we think
that the non-asymptotic conclusion is plausible for many setups and
can be defended, the asymptotic conclusion is more than dubious.
If the asymptotic conclusion applied directly to modern democracies
with their large populations, these democracies would be essentially
infallible when making decisions between two alternatives by simple
majority.
What went wrong? The CJT rests on two central premises. Stated
roughly, the first premise is that the voters vote independently from
each other, and the second premise is that each voter is competent,
i.e. is more likely to vote for the correct than the incorrect alternative
(both premises will later be spelt out more carefully and then revised).
Our negative finding is the implausibility of the premises – specifically,
the independence premise – which explains the implausible asymptotic
conclusion of infallible large groups. The non-asymptotic conclusion that
larger groups perform better, by contrast, is plausible, but is currently
relying on implausible premises and therefore left hanging without
support. Our negative finding can be summed up in a table:
Plausible?
Condorcet’s premises No
The asymptotic conclusion No
The non-asymptotic conclusion Yes
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Our positive finding consists in a revision of Condorcet’s premises.
The new, more plausible premises lead to the new, plausible asymptotic
conclusion that large groups are fallible. They also offer a justification
for the old non-asymptotic conclusion, which previously rested on
implausible premises. This will put us in a new position:
Plausible?
The new premises Yes
The new asymptotic conclusion Yes
The non-asymptotic conclusion (unchanged) Yes
The literature contains several other modifications of the original theorem.
Some of them improve the theorem’s conclusions; yet they revise the
premises in ways quite different from ours. We briefly review some
of these proposals, and contrast them with our own approach, whose
premises are philosophically transparent and defensible.
In fact, the classical CJT rests on yet another assumption, which is
implicit in the classical framework: people vote sincerely. This implicit
premise is no less problematic than the explicit premises. It was uncovered
in the 1990s and is being addressed in an ongoing literature. While much
progress has already been achieved along this dimension of strategic
voting, the problems underlying the explicit premises – specifically, the
premise of independent voting – have not yet been understood in a
systematic and foundational way.
Most believe that ‘something’ is wrong with Condorcet’s premises,
but confusion prevails over how best to conceptualize and solve the
problem. Addressing this is important also because the new literature
on strategic voting and the CJT, despite the progress over the classical
CJT literature along the strategic voting dimension, still rests on the
problematic independence premise (applied now to voters’ private
information rather than their votes). Since the strategic voting aspect is
orthogonal to the problems related to Condorcet’s explicit premises, it
is not addressed in the present analysis, though a few more remarks on
strategic voting will follow below.
This introduction is followed by seven sections. Section 1 begins
by laying out the classical CJT as it is often cited and applied in
the contemporary literature. In section 2 we show that the classical
independence assumption cannot be justified and will typically be false,
and propose a new, improved independence assumption. The revision
of the independence assumption requires using a new competence
assumption, which is provided in section 3. Section 4 contains our first
positive result, a new jury theorem based on the new independence and
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competence assumptions. We point out that the classical CJT is nothing
but a special case of our new theorem. In section 5 we highlight two
important implications of the new theorem for the theory of epistemic
democracy: deliberation and education may be crucial for the epistemic
performance of groups, whereas the classical CJT suggests that they are
inessential – since ‘crowds are infallible’ even without them – or even
dangerous – since deliberation threatens voter independence. Section 6
presents our second positive result, a jury theorem for interchangeable
(‘indistinguishable’) voters, generalizing Krishna Ladha’s (1993) seminal
jury theorem. Section 7 draws conclusions.
1. CONDORCET’S JURY THEOREM RECAPITULATED
We begin by stating and explaining the classical CJT before criticizing
its assumptions in the next sections. The first statement can be found in
Condorcet (1785), a translation of most parts in Sommerlad and McLean
(1989). The theorem has been stated in many variants; an influential
one is provided by Grofman et al. (1983). Among the most important
applications in political philosophy are Grofman and Feld’s (1988) use
of the CJT to interpret Rousseau’s ‘general will’ (cf. Estlund et al. 1989)
and, of course, the link between the CJT and epistemic conceptions of
democracy (Cohen 1986, Gaus 1997, List and Goodin 2001, Estlund 2008).
A link between the CJT, judgement aggregation and social epistemology
is offered by Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and List (2005). Several
important generalizations of the classical CJT have been proposed. For
instance, Owen et al. (1989) prove that the asymptotic part also holds
if judges are heterogeneous in competence, and Romeijn and Atkinson
(2011) analyse cases of unknown competence. Different papers recognize
that independence is hard to meet and/or prove jury theorems which
weaken the independence assumption (e.g. Nitzan and Paroush 1984,
Shapley and Grofman 1984, Boland 1989, Boland et al. 1989, Berg 1993,
Estlund 1994, Kaniovski 2010, Spiekermann and Goodin 2012).
Among the most systematic treatments of independence violations
so far is the work of Ladha (1992, 1993, 1995), who shows that shared
information and other common causes typically lead to correlated votes,
even if the jurors do not influence each other directly. He proves new jury
theorems which considerably weaken the independence assumption. In
the penultimate section we show that our jury theorem is related to and
can be used to generalize Ladha’s (1993) jury theorem for interchangeable
voters, which draws on de Finetti’s Theorem.
Despite mathematical achievements, previous analyses of voter
dependence do not tackle the conceptual core of the problem and provide
little guidance for institutional design. The question of the origin of
independence violations has remained obscure and unmodelled. For this
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 17 Jul 2014 IP address: 158.143.197.78
EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY WITH DEFENSIBLE PREMISES 91
reason the proposed independence relations are hard to interpret or
justify, and their empirical plausibility is difficult to assess. Among the
proposed independence relations, many seem suspicious in that they
retain the implausible asymptotic conclusion (a notable exception being
Ladha 1995, Proposition 4), and many seem ad hoc since they take the votes
to be jointly distributed in certain special, mathematically convenient
ways. To obtain a systematic account of voter (in)dependence, one must
understand how the causal interactions in the voters’ institutional and
deliberative environment create probabilistic dependence. We offer such
a methodological analysis for the first time by developing a general
network-theoretic account of voter dependence. It is inspired by, but
significantly goes beyond Dietrich and List (2004) and Dietrich (2008),
who also employ causal network reasoning but only focus on special cases
of independence violations.
We now give a precise rendering of the classical CJT. Let there be
a group of individuals, labelled i = 1, 2, 3, . . . The size of the group
(electorate) is any number n, which we assume to be odd to avoid ties
under majority voting.2 The group has to decide between two alternatives,
labelled 0 and 1. Exactly one of these alternatives is ‘correct’, ‘right’ or
‘better’.3 We will use the attribute ‘correct’ from now on. The correct
alternative is called the state (of the world) and is typically denoted x.
The state is generated by a random variable x, taking the values 0 and
1, each with positive probability. Each person votes for one alternative,
abstentions are not allowed. For each voter i we consider an event Ri, the
event that voter i votes correctly. (Some authors take the votes rather than
the correct voting events Ri as primitives of the model. This makes no
difference since the votes and the correct voting events are interdefinable
given the state x.4) We write Mn for the event that a majority of an n-
member electorate votes correctly.5
Classical Independence. Informally, the correct voting events are inde-
pendent given the state. Formally, R1, R2, . . . are independent conditional
on x.
2 As usual, our results can be generalized to an arbitrary group size n by assuming that ties
are broken by tossing a fair coin.
3 Many different notions of objectivity are compatible with that assumption, as long as the
right, correct or better answer is a fact that is determined entirely independently from the
votes of the individuals. This excludes procedural notions of rightness, where the ‘right’
solution is right just because it was arrived at by applying the appropriate procedure.
4 From Ri one can define i’s vote as the random variable vi in {0, 1} which matches the state
x in the event Ri and differs from x otherwise. Conversely, if one were to start from vi one
could define Ri as the event that vi = x.
5 The event Mn can be written as ∪I⊆{1, . . . ,n}:#I>n/2∩i∈IRi, because Mn means that there is
some set of individuals I⊆ {1, . . . , n} with more than n/2 members such that all individuals
i in I vote correctly, i.e. such that ∩i∈IRi obtains.
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Classical Competence. Informally, the probability of correct voting given
any state exceeds 12 and is the same across voters. Formally, for each state
x ∈ {0, 1}, Pr(Ri |x) exceeds 12 and does not depend on i (but possibly
on x).6
Condorcet Jury Theorem. Suppose Classical Independence and Classical
Competence. As the group size increases, the probability Pr(Mn) that a
majority votes correctly (i) increases7, and (ii) converges to one.
We now explain the two conditions and the theorem in turn. Events
are (conditionally) independent if learning that some of them occurred
does not change the (conditional) probability that others occurred.8 In
our case, the probability that some voters vote correctly (conditional
on a state) is not influenced by learning that some other voters vote
correctly. An analogy with coin tossing might help. Suppose a coin is
tossed independently many times, one toss for each voter. ‘Heads’ means
voting for alternative 1, ‘tails’ means voting for 0. The coin is not just
any coin but a predictor coin whose shape is influenced by the state of the
world: it is biased towards the correct outcome, in analogy to Classical
Competence. The tosses (votes) are not independent unconditionally,
since from the outcome of some of the tosses we learn something about
the coin shape, and hence about the other tosses. However, in analogy
to Classical Independence the tosses are independent conditional on the
state, since once we know the state, we know the shape of the coin, so that
tosses do not tell us anything new about the coin shape and hence about
other tosses.
With the two premises in place, we can turn to the theorem itself.
The CJT is nothing but an application of the law of large numbers.
In terms of our example, if the predictor coin is thrown very often, it
becomes exceedingly likely that the majority of results will be correct,
and this probability converges to 1 as the number of tosses tends to
infinity. Large groups are essentially infallible, even if its members are
only slightly competent (Goodin and Spiekermann 2012). For instance,
with competence only p = 0.51, a group of 100,000 voters – which is
still small for a modern democracy – would be correct in majority with
a probability of about 0.99999999987. This prediction of infallibility for
dichotomous factual choices does not withstand empirical scrutiny and
will be revised in due course.
6 All probabilistic statements refer to a probability measure Pr (defined over some
underlying algebra of events).
7 That is to say, strictly increases unless each voter is correct with probability one.
8 Formally, events are independent if for any (finite) number of them the probability that
they occur jointly equals the product of their probabilities. Conditional independence is
defined analogously, with probabilities replaced by conditional probabilities.
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Importantly, this framework does not distinguish between someone’s
vote and his sincere judgement. These two can come apart, since the
sincere voting profile may not form a Nash equilibrium (in a suitably
defined n-player Bayesian game with private information). This fact
was long overlooked, presumably because it was taken for granted that
strategic voting could not arise when all voters share the same preference
for correct collective decisions; it was brought to light in seminal work
by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998),
Coughlan (2000), and many others. As much as the literature’s current
concern for strategic-voting-related shortcomings of the classical model is
justified, it might have distracted the attention from the shortcomings of
Condorcet’s explicit premises, notably Classical Independence. Indeed, as
mentioned in the introduction, the strategic-voting literature on the CJT
takes independence of private information for granted, while becoming
more and more sophisticated on other dimensions. The current paper
returns to the origins by analysing and revising Condorcet’s two explicit
premises. Pursuing two goals at once is never a good idea, and therefore
we do not address strategic voting here. But how is one to read our
paper in light of the modern insights about strategic voting? Either, one
simply assumes that people’s votes match their sincere judgements.9 Or,
if one feels uncomfortable with this assumption, one may reinterpret
Ri as the event that voter i’s private pre-strategic judgement is correct
(whether or not it matches i’s vote), and Mn as the event that a majority
holds the correct private judgement. Under the latter interpretation,
this paper is not about voting but about private opinion formation
and the majority opinion; and the insights gained here about private
opinion formation would have to be combined with the modern insights
about strategic voting in order to form a complete analysis of epistemic
aggregation.
2. COMMON CAUSES AND THE FAILURE OF THE CLASSICAL
INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION
In this section we show that Classical Independence typically does not
hold in real-world decision problems and needs to be revised. Our critique
9 Under some specifications of the voters’ utilities, this typically implies that at least some
voters vote irrationally. These specifications make a voter’s utility depend only on the
pair of the state and the outcome (majority vote), where utility is high when the outcome
matches the state and low otherwise. However, as is often overlooked, voting sincerely
is typically rational as soon as voters also care at least slightly about whether their own
vote is sincere (for when maximising expected utility the sincerity concern outweighs
the outcome-oriented concern since the probability of pivotality is typically very small).
Here, the sincere voting assumption of the classical CJT is compatible with game-theoretic
rationality.
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of Classical Independence does not take the common line of pointing
out that voters can influence each other; rather we show that Classical
Independence is questionable even in the absence of any such causal
influences between voters. We start by developing an example that we
shall use repeatedly in due course. This will be followed by our core
argument against Classical Independence: the observation that voters are
typically influenced by common causes and therefore not independent in
the classical sense. Our New Independence assumption responds to this
problem.
Imagine a government relying on a group of economic advisers.
Towards the end of 2007, when the US housing market starts dropping,
the government wants to know whether a recession is imminent. It asks
all advisers and adopts the majority view. To ensure that the experts
do not influence each other, safeguards are in place to prevent any
communication between them. If the classical CJT applied, we could
conclude that the probability of a correct majority vote converges to 1 as
more and more advisers are consulted. But this conclusion is unlikely to
be true because Classical Independence is typically violated even though
the experts do not communicate. To see this, consider a few examples.
First, if all economists rely on the same publicly available evidence,
then this evidence will usually cause them to vote in the same way. For
instance, if all the evidence misleadingly suggests healthy growth (with
the evidence indicating, say, that banks have much healthier balance
sheets than they actually have) while a bank crash is already around
the corner, then most reasonable economists will be wrong in their
prediction. The votes are then dependent ‘through’ consulting the same
evidence. More precisely, given for instance that alternative 1 is correct,
incorrect votes for 0 by some voters raise the probability of misleading
evidence, which in turn raises the probability that other voters also vote
incorrectly, a violation of independence. Second, if all economists rely on
the same theoretical assumptions for the interpretation of the evidence
(such as low correlations between market prices of certain credit default
swaps), this common influence is likely to induce dependence between
the votes. In the extreme, either all get it right or all get it wrong. Finally,
if the experts are more likely to make wrong predictions in weather
that gives headaches, then weather creates dependence between votes.
Again, in the extreme either all get it right or all get it wrong (and have
headaches).
In all these examples, the economic experts are not classically
independent and therefore the classical CJT cannot be applied. At the
same time, the experts are independent in a different sense. They are
independent if we hold all the common causes fixed, or, in different
words, if we conditionalize on all the common causes that influence
them. Given the economists’ particular common evidence, their common
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FIGURE 1. Two simple causal networks with common causes.
background theories, the commonly experienced weather, and all other
common causes, their judgements are independent.
We now introduce our new conception of independence more
systematically, drawing on the well-established theory of causal networks.
The classical independence of votes can be undermined when a common
cause influences all voters. This follows from Reichenbach’s influential
common cause principle, which is usually understood thus: a more frequent
than expected coincidence between a set of phenomena, which do not
affect each other, is due to (possibly hidden) common causes, and
the phenomena become independent once we conditionalize on these
common causes (Reichenbach 1956: 159-160). Slightly more precisely:
Common Cause Principle (CCP). Any probabilistic dependence between
phenomena which do not causally affect each other is due to common
causes, and these phenomena become probabilistically independent once
we conditionalize on their common causes.10
One can represent common causes graphically, as in Figure 1a. Figure 1a is
a very simple causal network, depicting the causal relations between a set
of variables. A node signifies a phenomenon, mathematically represented
as a random variable. An arrow signifies a causal influence in the direction
of the arrow.11 For simplicity, this and all other figures show only the
first two votes, labelled v1 and v2. Both votes are causally influenced by a
common cause c (common causes are shown as grey nodes in all figures).
If, for instance, the problem is to judge whether a defendant is guilty, then
the common cause c in Figure 1a could be a commonly observed witness
10 Usually, the common cause principle is stated for only two phenomena. We state it here
for an arbitrary number of phenomena such as many votes. The CCP is developed more
formally in the theory of Bayesian networks (e.g. Spirtes et al. (1993) and Pearl (2000).
11 We are not going to discuss causal and Bayesian networks in detail here. For a thorough
introduction see Pearl (2000: ch. 1). Formally, a causal network is a so-called directed acyclic
graph, which consists of a set of nodes (carrying random variables) and a set of directed
arrows between distinct nodes (representing causal relevance between variables) such
that there is no directed cycle of arrows.
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FIGURE 2. A causal network with private and common causes.
report, fingerprint, or other shared evidence; in all these examples, c is
causally influenced by the fact x of whether the defendant is guilty, as
represented by the arrow pointing from x towards c.12 The effect of c on
votes is indicated by the arrows from c towards each vote. Note that there
are no arrows between any votes, indicating that the votes do not have
a causal influence on each other. But even though the votes are causally
independent, they are not probabilistically independent due to the common
cause c.
Compare Figure 1a with 1b. In 1b, the two votes v1 and v2 are still
influenced by the common cause, but now the direction of causality
between common cause and state is swapped so that c is affecting x. To
make this plausible, consider an example. Suppose the task for the voters
is to decide whether the streets are wet in Windsor, but all voters are
placed in central London. Further suppose that the voters follow a simple
heuristic: they predict that the streets are wet in Windsor if and only if
the weather is bad in London. In that case, c could be seen as the weather
pattern over southeast England, influencing both the votes and the state.
So, in this network the common cause c (the weather) influences the state
x (dry or wet streets in Windsor), and not the other way round, unlike in
Figure 1a.
Let us consider a more complicated example. In Figure 2 we include a
number of causes from c1 to c3. We can now distinguish between private
and common causes. In this causal network, the cause c2 affects both votes
and hence is a common cause. c1 and c3, by contrast, are private causes
because they only affect one vote each. By definition, common causes are
nodes that have directed paths of arrows to more than one vote node. This
is why x is also a common cause (and is therefore displayed in grey): it has
paths running to v1 (through c1 or c2) and to v2 (through c2 or c3).
12 While votes are dichotomous random variables, taking only the values 0 or 1, a cause
such as c need not be dichotomous. For instance, shared evidence can take more than two
forms.
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FIGURE 3. A causal network with private and common causes, some of which are
non-evidential.
Figure 3 shows another, slightly more complicated, causal network.
As before, we have common causes (c3, c4 and x) and private causes (c1, c2,
c5 and c6). But in contrast to the previous figures, we can now distinguish
between non-evidential causes that are not related to the state (c2, c4 and
c6 ) and evidential causes that are. Non-evidential causes are factors that
influence voters causally but do not provide them with evidence as to the
correct alternative. These could be common non-evidential causes (such as
the weather influencing all our economic advisors in the example above)
or private non-evidential causes (such as a domestic argument influencing
the judgement of one advisor).
In all figures shown so far the votes v1 and v2 are not state-
conditionally independent because of common causes (other than x). That
votes have such common causes is not in any way unusual. To assume that
there are none, as the classical CJT does, is to assume a highly construed,
artificial decision problem that is unlikely to occur in real-life settings.
Thus, Classical Independence is typically violated. This means that the
conclusions of the CJT rest on a (typically) false premise. The upshot is
that the independence assumption must be revised.
We now introduce a more defensible independence assumption. The
CCP implies that events are independent conditional on all their common
causes. So independence of votes can be achieved if we conditionalize in
the right way. The classical CJT conditionalized on x only. But to catch
all the common causes, both evidential and non-evidential, we propose
to conditionalize on the decision problem at hand. Following Dietrich
(2008), the decision problem is a description of all relevant features of
the task the group faces. The problem captures not only the state of
the world but also all relevant circumstances, which we interpret as all
common causes of the votes, thus excluding purely individual factors. We
therefore conditionalize on the state of the world and all common causes,
as indicated by the dashed rectangles in Figures 1–3. Both components of
a decision problem are indispensable. Defining the problem without the
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circumstances does not work, as we have seen. Defining it without the
state x is not plausible either, since this would leave the correct answer
indeterminate. Often x is itself a common cause anyhow, as in Figures 1a,
2 and 3 but not in Figure 1b.
We now return to the formal model, leaving the motivational
discussion based on causal networks behind. As far as model ingredients
are concerned, only one amendment of the classical model is needed.
We keep the correct voting events R1, R2, . . . but dispose of the state
variable x in favour of a new random variable π , the problem, whose
realisations are the various possible problems π that the group might
face.13 Interpretationally, the problem captures not just the state of the
world but also the circumstances (common causes) the voters face.
We are now ready to state our revised independence premise.
New Independence. The events R1, R2, . . . that voters 1, 2, . . . vote
correctly are independent conditional on the problem π .14
This assumption is far more defensible than the classical one; by
conditionalizing on the problem, we fix all those circumstances which, if
left variable, could lead to voter correlation. In Figure 3, for instance, by
conditionalizing on the problem one conditionalizes on all the common
causes, both evidential (like c3 in Figure 3) and non-evidential (like c4 in
Figure 3), so that the two events become probabilistically independent. In
the terminology of causal networks, the common causes ‘screen off’ the
votes from each other, so that conditionalizing on these causes removes
any correlations between votes.
For the interested reader, appendix B briefly sketches the more formal
network-theoretic foundation of New Independence; there, the network-
theoretic motivation given above is turned into a theorem.
3. THE NEED TO REVISE THE COMPETENCE ASSUMPTION
The Classical Competence assumption is not unreasonable; in fact it is
plausibly true. It tells us that the voters are more likely to vote correctly
than incorrectly. But when combined with our New Independence
assumption (rather than with the unrealistic classical one) it doesn’t imply
that large groups are better than small ones in their majority judgements.
Consider our group of economic advisers again. It is plausible
to assume that each economist is on average better than random in
answering economic yes/no questions such as whether a recession
13 Problems can (and will in real life) be highly complex objects. Our model accounts for
such complexity without loss of parsimony.
14 Independence conditional on the random variable π means that for any value which π
may take (with positive probability) there is independence conditional on π taking this
value. This definition assumes that π is discrete, i.e. takes only countably many values.
For the general definition of independence conditional on an arbitrary random variable
we refer the reader to standard textbooks.
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is imminent. However, we also know that economists are often not
competent when considering one single problem, because some problems
are more difficult than others. For instance, very few economists correctly
predicted that the initially quite limited banking crisis of 2008 would
trigger a major recession in 2009. With hindsight we have learned that
predicting this crisis was a difficult problem because economists faced
misleading data and worked with questionable or incorrect assumptions.
In many other settings, predicting a recession is easy (or at least easier) and
economists are more likely to be correct in their predictions. Economists
can be competent on average, as demanded by the Classical Competence
assumption, without being competent on a difficult problem.
Classical Competence may hold, but since our New Independence
assumption conditionalizes on the problem, we will need a problem-
specific notion of competence. To show this need we give a stylized
example in which large groups are much worse than small ones, despite
classical voter competence. This demonstrates that the conclusions of the
classical CJT may fail if Classical Independence is replaced with New
Independence while retaining Classical Competence. Suppose there are
only two types of problems, ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ ones, where each type is
equally likely to occur. Each voter i is correct on any easy problem with
probability 0.99, and on any difficult one with probability 0.49. That is,
Pr(Ri |π ) =
{
0.99 for every easy problem π
0.49 for every difficult problem π .
First note that each voter i is competent in the sense that he votes
correctly with probability Pr(Ri ) = 12 × 0.99 + 12 × 0.49 = 0.74. Also the
two state-conditional competence parameters, Pr(Ri |x = 1) and Pr(Ri |x =
0), exceed 12 under mild additional conditions (essentially, there shouldn’t
be a too high correlation between problem type and state). So, Classical
Competence holds. Despite the voters’ high competence, the majority’s
competence in a large group is low and well below individual
competence. Indeed, the probability that the majority is correct is
Pr(Mn) = 12 × Pr(Mn|π is easy) +
1
2
× Pr(Mn|π is difficult),
where the term Pr(Mn|π is easy) is roughly one, but the term Pr(Mn|π is
difficult) is roughly 12 if n is small (because voters are only slightly worse
than fair coins) but tends to zero as n tends to infinity;15 so,
Pr(Mn) ≈
{
1
2 × 1 + 12 × 12 = 34 for small n
1
2 × 1 + 12 × 0 = 12 for large n.
15 It tends to zero because, given a difficult problem, the proportion of correct votes tends to
0.49 by the law of large numbers.
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FIGURE 4. A discrete distribution of problem-specific competence with tendency to
exceed 12 . The x-axis shows competence levels, the y-axis their probabilities.
Large groups are worse here than small groups or single individuals! In
terms of our example, asking just one economist would be better than
asking many because the majority of the many is increasingly likely to get
the difficult problem wrong.
We thus need a new notion of competence: one that is relative to
the decision problem. Let us define a voter i’s (problem-specific) competence
as pπi = Pr(Ri |π), the probability that i votes correctly conditional on the
problem. Its value depends on the problem; intuitively, it is high for ‘easy’
problems and low for ‘difficult’ ones. In the last example, problem-specific
competence is 0.99 or 0.49, depending on whether the problem is easy
or difficult. The value taken for a particular problem π – a particular
realization of π – is called the competence on π , denoted pπi = Pr(Ri |π ).
Figure 4 gives an example of how the distribution of a voter i’s problem-
specific competence could look like. There is a 10% probability of facing
a problem on which competence is as high as 1 (i.e. the voter is always
right), a 20% probability of facing a problem on which competence is 0.8,
and so on for the competence levels of 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and 0. While in Figure
4 problem-specific competence follows a discrete distribution (with six
possible values), Figure 5 shows an example in which problem-specific
competence follows a continuous distribution given by a density function
over the interval [0, 1]. Of course, many other discrete or continuous
distributions of problem-specific competence are imaginable.
Notice that in Figures 4 and 5 a voter’s problem-specific competence
on the interval [0, 1] tends to exceed 12 , so that, informally, he is more likely
to face an ‘easy’ problem (on which competence is high) than a ‘difficult’
problem (on which competence is low). In short, the voter finds more
problems easy than difficult. Clearly, this is a notion of voter ‘competence’,
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FIGURE 5. A continuous distribution of problem-specific competence with
tendency to exceed 12 . The x-axis shows competence levels, the y-axis their
probability densities.
but a somewhat different one than that required by Classical Competence.
To state this notion more precisely, we first formally define what it
means for a (discrete or continuous) random variable or distribution in
the interval [0, 1] to tend to exceed 12 . In the discrete case (see Figure
4), it simply means that the value 12 +  is at least as probable as the
symmetrically opposed value 12 − , for all ε > 0. In the continuous case
with a continuous density function (see Figure 5), it means that this
density is at least as high at 12 +  as at 12 − , for all ε > 0.16 (Since all
inequalities need only hold weakly this is a weak definition of ‘tendency
to exceed 12 ’; an alternative, strong definition is provided in Appendix A.)
We are now ready to state the new competence assumption:
New Competence. Problem-specific competence pπi (i) tends to exceed
1
2
and (ii) is the same for all voters i, that is, pπi ≡ pπ .
To paraphrase this condition once more, the problem is more likely to be
of the sort on which voters are competent than of the sort on which they
are incompetent (where voters are homogeneous in competence, as in the
classical setup). There are many plausible examples where (discrete or
continuous) problem-specific competence tends to exceed 12 , as in Figures
4 and 5.17
16 There is a unified definition. An arbitrary random variable or distribution in [0, 1] tends to
exceed 12 if a value in [
1
2 + , 12 + ′] is at least as probable as a value in the symmetrically
opposed interval [ 12 − ′, 12 − ], for all ε′ ≥ ε > 0. This definition is equivalent to the first
resp. second special definition stated in the main text if the distribution is of the first resp.
second special kind.
17 Regarding Figure 4, check that Pr(pπ = 1) = 0.1 ≥ 0.05 = Pr(pπ = 0), Pr(pπ = 0.8) =
0.2 ≥ 0.1 = Pr(pπ = 0.2), Pr(pπ = 0.6) = 0.35 ≥ 0.2 = Pr(pπ = 0.4), and Pr(pπ = 12 + ) =
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The New Competence assumption formalizes an idea stated
informally at the beginning of the section in terms of our economist
example. The economists face easy and difficult problems. Some problems
are very hard, for example predicting the global recession of 2009, but
fortunately not all problems are like that. If the economists are good
economists they find most problems easy and fewer problems difficult.
Unlike the Classical Competence assumption, our new assumption makes
no explicit statement about the economists’ average competence across all
problems, or across all problems for which a given state x in {0, 1} obtains.
Instead, we assume that the economists more often have high than low
competence.
As expected, our competence assumption fails for the paradoxical
scenario discussed earlier in this section, since there a voter’s problem-
specific competence is less likely to be 0.51 than 0.49, since Pr(pπ = 0.51) =
0 and Pr(pπ = 0.49) = 12 .18 The violation of New Competence is the deeper
reason for our counterintuitive finding that large groups are worse than
single individuals.
4. A NEW JURY THEOREM
Our New Jury Theorem is based on the New Independence and
Competence assumptions. To introduce it, consider again our panel of
economic advisers having to predict whether there will be a recession. We
assume (from New Independence) that given any problem the events of
correct predictions are independent across voters. We also assume (from
New Competence) that the prediction problem is more likely to be easy
than difficult. Our New Jury Theorem states that increasing the group
size will increase the probability of a correct majority, sampled across
prediction problems. This is the old non-asymptotic conclusion of the
CJT, but based on new premises. Our New Jury Theorem also states that
for very large groups the collective competence no longer approaches
one (revising the old, unrealistic asymptotic conclusion). Rather, the
asymptotic value now depends on the proportion of easy problems.
0 ≥ 0 = Pr(pπ = 12 − ) for all ε > 0 such that ε = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. Regarding Figure 5, check
that the plotted density is at least as high at 12 +  as at 12 −  for all ε > 0.
18 Note that the support of the competence distribution – namely, the set {.49, .99} –
seems artificial in that it is very small and not symmetric around the middle 12 . In
modelling practice, most distributions on [0, 1] have symmetric support, as they are
either continuous and supported by the full interval [0, 1] (as in Figure 5) or discrete
and supported by a regular grid of the form { km : k = 0, . . . ,m} for a positive integer m
(as in Figure 4, where m = 5). As long as the competence distribution has symmetric
support, this distribution is plausibly compatible with our New Competence assumption.
By definition, the support of a distribution on [0, 1] is the minimal topologically closed set S
⊆ [0, 1] of probability one, and S is symmetric (around 12 ) just in case 12 +  ∈ S ⇔ 12 −  ∈ S
for all ε > 0.
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More precisely, the theorem goes as follows:
New Jury Theorem. Suppose New Independence and New Competence.
As the group size increases, the probability that a majority votes correctly
(i) increases, and (ii) converges to a value which is less than one if Pr(pπ >
1
2 ) = 1 (and one if Pr(pπ > 12 ) = 1).
Remark: As the proof shows, the value to which the probability of a correct
majority converges is
Pr
(
pπ >
1
2
)
+ 1
2
Pr
(
pπ = 1
2
)
,
the probability that the problem is easy plus half of the probability that
the problem is on the boundary between easy and difficult.
While proving the non-asymptotic conclusion is not straightforward
(see Appendix C), it is easy to develop an intuition of what is driving
the asymptotic conclusion and the remark. We know that voters (our
economic advisers, for instance) have a probability greater than 12 to vote
correctly on easy problems, smaller than 12 on difficult problems, and
equal to 12 on boundary problems. So, by the law of large numbers, in
the limit the majority will be correct on easy problems, wrong on difficult
problems, and correct with probability 12 on boundary problems. Hence,
the limiting probability of the majority being correct, averaged over all
problems, is as specified in the remark. For example, if our economic
advisers face easy problems 80%, difficult problems 20%, and boundary
problems 0% of the time, then increasing the group of advisers will let
their collective competence converge to 0.8.
The conclusion that majority performance increases crucially depends
on the assumption that problem-specific competence tends to exceed 12 .
We have so far only defined a weak sense of ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’,
while relegating an alternative, strong definition to Appendix A. If in our
theorem we use the weak definition, then in the conclusion ‘increases’
means ‘weakly increases’ because of some rare, degenerate cases in which
majority performance remains constant.19 But if we use the strong defini-
tion, then ‘increases’ means ‘strictly increases’. See Appendix A for details.
The mathematical power and generality of our New Jury Theorem
is that it holds regardless of how we specify the problem variable π .
Indeed, although we have suggested a specific interpretation of π –
it captures common causes – we are mathematically free in how we
specify it. Let us illustrate this flexibility by considering two very simple
19 Such as the case that pπ is distributed exactly symmetrically around 12 (here this probability
is constantly 12 ), or the case that problem-specific competence p
π is always one (here the
probability of a correct majority is constantly one).
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specifications, which depart from our suggested interpretation by not
capturing the common causes. These ‘naive’ specifications allow us to
recover (in fact, strengthen) the classical CJT in two variants. For under
these specifications our premises and conclusions reduce to the classical
ones.
First, suppose π takes only two values, 0 and 1, representing
the state of the world. So π plays precisely the same role as the state in
the classical CJT; we accordingly write x for π . To show that we obtain the
Classical CJT, note that Classical Independence implies (in fact, is directly
equivalent to) New Independence, and Classical Competence implies
New Competence, so that our theorem tells us that the probability of a
correct majority vote is increasing in group size and (by Pr(px > 12 ) = 1)
converges to one, just as in the Classical CJT. In fact, this strengthens the
Classical CJT since New Competence is a weaker premise than Classical
Competence.20
Second, assume even more simply that π takes only one value – there
is just a single problem. Conditionalizing on this fixed problem is as
much as not conditionalizing at all. Therefore, our two premises take a
particularly simple form:
– the events R1, R2, . . . are (unconditionally) independent, and
– competence – the unconditional probability Pr(Ri ) – is at least 12 and
the same across voters.
As for our theorem’s conclusions, they are here the classical ones: majority
competence is increasing in group size and converges to one (unless
competence is exactly 12 ).
5. EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY: DELIBERATION AND EDUCATION
Our findings have implications for theories of epistemic democracy. This
section develops two issues. First, our framework brings to light the
benefits of deliberation by removing the worry that independence could
be undermined once our new independence notion is adopted. Second,
the framework rehabilitates the importance of individual competence
for group performance, and hence of education and other competence-
boosting policy measures.
Normatively attractive conceptions of democracy involve interactions
of voters before the vote. Indeed, many democratic theorists emphasize
the importance of deliberation for democratic legitimacy or the quality
of democratic outputs. The problem is that such interactions may
20 Because under New Competence a voter’s problem-specific (‘state-specific’) competence
px need not always exceed 12 as long as it tends to exceed
1
2 in our technical sense. For
instance, it could be that p1 = 0.6 and p0 = 0.4, where x is more likely 1 than 0.
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undermine independence when construed classically, as many have
stressed. Nonetheless, confusion prevails over how deliberation creates
dependence, and what this implies for jury theorems. Adrian Vermeule
describes the challenge well:
What is unclear is whether, and to what extent, independence is compro-
mised by deliberation, discussion, or even common social background or
professional training. [. . .] Absent any general account of this, the basic reach
of the Jury Theorem is not well understood and no amount of possibility
theorems or anecdotes about wise crowds will tell us whether the Theorem
is an important tool of political and legal theory or a minor curiosity.
(Vermeule 2009: 6–7, reference and footnote omitted)
Our analysis responds to this challenge by offering the required
‘general account’ – in terms of causal networks – and by revising the
independence notion so as to conditionalize on all common causes,
including deliberation. A somewhat different response would be to
stick to Classical Independence and try to enforce it by preventing all
deliberation, as discussed by Grofman and Feld (1988) in their seminal
work connecting the Condorcet Jury Theorem with Rousseau’s ‘general
will’. Many find this approach normatively unacceptable. Aside from the
normative worry, preventing deliberation is only sensible if it is true that
deliberation creates dependence. But is it? Jeremy Waldron is guardedly
optimistic that it is not:
The sort of interaction between voters that would compromise indepen-
dence would be interaction in which voter X decided in favour of a given
option just because voter Y did. [. . .] But X’s being persuaded by Y in
argument or holding itself open to such persuasion does not in itself involve
X’s deciding to vote one way rather than another because of the way Y is
voting. (Waldron in Estlund et al. 1989: 1327)
Waldron here identifies the paradigmatic case of dependence: one voter
following another blindly. Spelled out in our causal-network-theoretic
terms, Waldron’s point is that persuasion and deliberation by themselves
do not undermine independence because they do not constitute causal
effects (arrows) between votes but causal effects (arrows) from earlier
phenomena c – such as speech acts – to votes. Thus restated, it becomes
clear that Waldron’s argument is in fact a defence of New rather than
Classical Independence, since persuasive speech acts will, like other
common causes of votes, threaten Classical but not New Independence.
Indeed, persuasion counts among the more subtle threats to Classical
Independence, working through common causation rather than inter-
causation of votes, as illustrated in many of our figures above. Persuasion
and deliberation could, for instance, mean that the voters align their
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theories or the set of evidence they use, thereby introducing powerful
common causes that undermine Classical Independence.
David Estlund points out that Classical Independence can sometimes
be met even when there are common causes or inter-causation of votes
(Estlund 2008: 225). He refers to causal setups where the different effects
cancel each other out such that probabilistic independence obtains. It
needs to be said, however, that while such settings are logically possible,
they are exceedingly rare, especially when many voters are involved.
Typically, common causes are ubiquitous, and there is little hope that
Classical Independence is preserved after deliberation.
However, deliberation does not necessarily increase voter dependence
in the classical sense. It could decrease dependence by reducing the
influence of certain other common causes (like room temperature)
or direct causal influences between voters. It is therefore not always
obvious whether deliberation overall increases or decreases dependence,
another reason why the classical CJT literature struggles so much with
deliberation. Our framework, by contrast, avoids this fruitless struggle.
We give the deliberative process its proper place by including it in the
description of the problem π , and after having conditionalized on this
richly described problem, deliberation does not threaten independence
any more.
The classical framework leaves one with the unsatisfactory diagnosis
that successful deliberation typically increases voter competence on the
one hand, but typically reduces voter independence on the other. Given
this unresolved trade-off, the overall effect on group performance could be
positive or negative. The diverging claims in the literature about whether
deliberation is beneficial demonstrate this all too well. With our New
Theorem, by contrast, we can focus exclusively on how deliberation affects
(New) Competence. In the language of our framework, deliberation
is epistemically beneficial if it increases the voters’ problem-specific
competence (that is, shifts its distribution to the right). If it does, it also
raises the probability that a majority is correct. Thus, deliberation should
be interpreted as a process that affects the probability distribution of
problem-specific competence, without undermining New Independence.
For illustration, consider our economic advisers one last time. If they
deliberate and exchange evidence or views, they do not thereby threaten
New Independence (because this deliberation process is part of the
problem we conditionalize on), but they might raise their problem-specific
competence, turning difficult into easier problems. Consequently, a group
of deliberating economists may perform better because they are more
likely to face decisions they tend to get right, while isolated economists
may not.
Our framework has another advantage over the classical one.
In its policy recommendation, the classical framework puts all the
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emphasis on increasing the size of the electorate, suggesting that this
suffices for optimal group performance. Classically, large groups can
be made infallible without increasing individual competence, just by
increasing group size. This loses sight of another important aspect of
institutional design: the improvement of individual competence. Our
framework restores the picture, showing that individual competence
levels matter considerably, since they determine the upper bound on
group performance. Policy measures such as improving education may
raise the upper bound. Put bluntly, not just the size but also the quality of
crowds matters.
6. A NEW JURY THEOREM FOR INTERCHANGEABLE VOTERS
Ladha (1993) proves a jury theorem based on the assumption that the vot-
ers (more precisely, the events that they vote correctly) are interchangeable
in de Finetti’s sense. Our New Jury Theorem is mathematically related
to Ladha’s jury theorem for interchangeable voters. In fact, it can be
used to derive a more general variant of Ladha’s theorem, as we now
show.
Intuitively, finitely many events are interchangeable if they are
perfectly symmetric in their probabilities. For instance, the probability that
only the first event holds equals the probability that only the fourth holds,
the probability that only the first and third hold equals the probability
that only the second and fifth hold, and so on. Formally, the sequence of
correct voting events in the group of size n, (R1, . . . , Rn), is interchangeable
if for any permutation (Ri1 , . . . , Rin) and any subgroup J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, it is
equally likely that only the voters in J vote correctly as it is that only the
voters in {ij:j ∈ J} vote correctly, i.e.
Pr
(
(∩i∈J Ri ) ∩
(∩i∈{1,...,n}\J Ri)) = Pr ((∩i∈J Ri j ) ∩ (∩i∈{1,...,n}\J Ri j )) ,
where A stands for the complement of the event A.21 If for every group
size n the events (R1, . . . , Rn) are interchangeable, then the infinitely many
events (R1, R2, . . .) are called interchangeable.
Ladha makes the following assumption:
Voter Interchangeability. The events of correct voting (R1, R2, . . .) are
interchangeable.
The assumption of interchangeability can be motivated by interpreting
probabilities as representing the beliefs of an observer or social planner
21 Put differently, the events (R1, . . . , Rn) are exchangeable if their joint distribution (or more
precisely, the joint distribution in {0, 1}n of the indicator random variables of these events)
is invariant under permutation.
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with limited information, for whom the voters look perfectly symmetric
(no matter whether voters are objectively similar in that way). The
mathematical import of voter interchangeability is that, by de Finetti’s
Theorem (1937), it implies the existence of a (discrete or continuous)
random variable α in [0, 1], conditional on which these correct voting
events (i) are independent and (ii) each have the same probability
Pr(Ri |α) = α.
This conditional independence of the correct voting events suggests
applying our New Jury Theorem to the case in which the problem π is
defined as α (which is mathematically possible, although it deviates from
our interpretation of π as capturing common causes). For this specification
of the problem π the homogeneity part of New Competence holds since
problem-specific competence Pr(Ri |π ) (= Pr(Ri |α) = α) is the same for
all voters i. In addition, we obtain the peculiar result that problem-
specific competence Pr(Ri |π) and the problem π are the same random
variable (namely, α), so that problem-specific competence tends to exceed
1
2 (as assumed in New Competence) just in case π (= α) tends to exceed
1
2 . Hence, our New Jury Theorem can be re-stated as follows for this
particular specification of the problem:
Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters. Suppose Voter Interchange-
ability holds and the random variable α obtained in de Finetti’s Theorem
tends to exceed 12 . As the group size increases, the probability that a
majority votes correctly (i) increases, and (ii) converges to a value which
is less than one if Pr(α > 12 ) = 1 (and one if Pr(α > 12 ) = 1).
Conceptually, this theorem operates in a slimmer setup than our earlier
theorem because it does not require the exogenous random variable
π . Instead, it draws on the random variable α, which is generated
endogenously from the assumption of interchangeability. One may
interpret α as the degree to which the decision task at hand is ‘easy’, since
conditional on α a voter votes correctly with probability α.
The variable α is less obscure than it may seem, since it can be defined
directly from the correctness events R1, R2, . . . Indeed, α can be obtained as
the correctness frequency, i.e. the proportion of correct votes (in the limit as
the group size increases). Using this approach to α, one may reformulate
our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters without referring to de
Finetti’s Theorem. Details are given in Appendix A.
Again, the theorem can be read in different ways, depending on
whether ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ is defined in a weak or strong sense. In the
first case the term ‘increases’ in the theorem’s conclusion means ‘weakly
increases’ (since in rare and degenerate cases majority performance
remains constant), while in the second case ‘increases’ means ‘strictly
increases’.
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How does our theorem generalize Ladha’s precursor? Ladha assumes
Voter Interchangeability (like us) and assumes that the distribution of
α is of a certain kind, which is a special case of our assumption that
α tends to exceed 12 .
22 From these assumptions, Ladha deduces that
the probability of majority correctness weakly exceeds the probability of
single-voter correctness Pr(Ri ), which follows from our non-asymptotic
conclusion.23
Finally, we remark that the value to which the probability of a correct
majority converges in the theorem is
Pr
(
a >
1
2
)
+ 1
2
Pr
(
a = 1
2
)
.
7. CONCLUSION
Condorcet’s classical jury theorem has an enormous influence, but its
independence assumption is implausible and is responsible for the
overly optimistic asymptotic conclusion that ‘large groups are infallible’.
The non-asymptotic conclusion that ‘larger groups perform better’, by
contrast, is often plausible, but is in need of a new justification, grounded
on more defensible premises. We have provided such a justification. Our
revised independence assumption does not require independence across
all decision problems but independence given the specific problem. This
allows us to conditionalize on common causes which would otherwise
have induced dependence. This new independence assumption requires a
new competence assumption: rather than assuming voter competence on
average over all problems, we assume that the voters’ problem-specific
competence is more often high than low. Based on our two revised
premises, our New Jury Theorem retains the classical conclusion that
‘larger crowds are wiser’ but obtains the new asymptotic conclusion
that ‘large crowds are fallible’. Specifically, the probability of a correct
majority vote converges to the probability that the problem is easy in
a technical sense. These conclusions vindicate majoritarian democracy –
it is worth listening to many rather than few – without being absurdly
optimistic about the correctness of democratic decisions. The move from
22 Specifically, he assumes that the distribution of α either (i) is unimodal and symmetric
with mean greater than 1/2, or (ii) has support included in (1/2, 1], or (iii) is a beta-
distribution with mean greater than 1/2. In each case, the distribution tends to exceed
1
2 .
23 More precisely, he states that the probability of majority correctness strictly exceeds the
probability of single-voter correctness. This strict inequality does not follow from Ladha’s
assumptions in the form (i) or (ii) mentioned in fn. 22 (as is seen from the case that
Pr(α = 1) = 1). Ladha’s result (i.e. his Proposition 1) may be repaired either by weakening
the result’s conclusion to a weak inequality or by adding to the result’s premises the
assumption that Pr(α = 1) = 1.
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the classical CJT to our New Jury Theorem can be summarized in a
table:
Classical CJT New Jury Theorem
Independence premise implausible plausible
Competence premise plausible plausible
Do larger groups perform better? yes yes
Are very large groups infallible? yes no
Our theorem leads to different policy implications than the classical one
with regard to the importance of deliberation and education. The worry
that deliberation threatens voter independence disappears by moving to
our new notion of independence, so that one can focus on the potentially
beneficial effect of deliberation on voter competence. The importance of
promoting voter competence (through education, deliberation and other
measures) is rehabilitated. Indeed, while the classical model implies that
the level of voter competence is essentially irrelevant – since large enough
groups are infallible even if their members are just a little competent – our
model implies that the performance of large groups strongly depends on
voter competence, as measured by the proportion of decision problems
voters find easy (in our technical sense). Overall, we believe our findings
give more credibility to epistemic arguments for democracy based on jury
theorems.
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A. SOME EXTENSIONS
First extension. As already mentioned, there are different readings or variants
of our New Jury Theorem. They differ, firstly, in the precise definition of when
a random variable (here, problem-specific competence) ‘tends to exceed 12 ’, and
secondly, in whether the theorem’s conclusion that majority performance increases
holds in the weak or strict sense. Only one (weak) notion of ‘tendency to exceed
1
2 ’ was defined in the main text; it leads to weakly increasing group performance
(though the cases where majority performance increases non-strictly are rare and
degenerate; see footnote 19 for examples).
We now introduce two alternative notions of when a random variable or
distribution in [0, 1] ‘tends to exceed 12 ’. (We state the definitions for the discrete
case; see footnote 24 for the general case.) Our original (‘first’) notion can be
termed ‘weak tendency to exceed 12 ’ and was defined by the condition that
for all  ∈ (0, 12 ] the value 12 +  is at least as probable as 12 − .(1)
To obtain the second notion we modify this condition by lifting the requirement
about the probabilities of the boundary values 1 and 0. The second notion can be
termed ‘weak tendency to exceed 12 within the open interval (0, 1)’ and is defined by
the following condition (note that  = 12 ):
for all  ∈ (0, 12 ) the value 12 +  is at least as probable as 12 − .(2)
Finally, to obtain the third notion we further modify the condition by excluding
the extreme case that all inequalities are equalities. This third notion can be termed
‘strong tendency to exceed 12 within (0, 1)’ and is defined by the condition that
24
for all  ∈ (0, 12 ), the value 12 +  is at least as probable as 12 − ,
and at least one of these inequalities holds in the strict sense.
(3)
We can now formally state three alternative readings of our New Jury Theorem:
24 In the general, possibly non-discrete case, the three notions are defined as follows.
The generalization of (1) is that, for all 0 <  ≤ ′ ≤ 12 , a value in [ 12 + , 12 + ′] is at
least as probable as a value in the symmetrically opposed interval [ 12 − ′, 12 − ]. The
generalization of ( 2) is obtained by replacing ‘′ ≤ 12 ’ by ‘e ′ < 12 ’. The generalization of (3)
is obtained by moreover adding the requirement that at least one of the inequalities holds
strictly (or equivalently, by adding the requirement that the probability of the interval
( 12 , 1) strictly exceeds that of the interval (0,
1
2 )).
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Remark. The New Jury Theorem holds in three variants: we may
(a) use the first notion of ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ and define ‘increasingness’
weakly; or
(b) use the second notion of ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ and define ‘increasingness’
weakly; or
(c) use the third notion of ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ and define ‘increasingness’
strictly.
Variant (a) of the theorem uses the main text’s definition of ‘tendency to
exceed 12 ’. Variant (b) logically strengthens variant (a) by lifting the assumption
that problem-specific competence is at least as likely to be 1 than 0. Variant (c)
shows that our strong sense of ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ allows for the stronger
conclusion that group performance grows strictly.
Note that the probabilities with which problem-specific competence takes
on any of the boundary values 0 and 1 is irrelevant for the growth of majority
performance, and for whether this growth is strict. In short, the boundary values
do not matter because conditional on problem-specific competence being 1 (resp.
0) the probability of a correct majority is constant – it equals 1 (resp. 0) regardless
of the group size.
Second extension. Our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters also has different
readings:
Remark. Our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters holds in each of the variants
(a), (b) and (c) of the previous remark.
Note again that whether majority performance grows – and whether it does
so strictly – only depends on how the variable α is distributed within (0, 1).
Third extension. The variable α in our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters
can be defined as the correctness frequency. The correctness frequency is formally
defined as the limit as n→∞ of the proportion of correct votes 1n
∑n
i=1 χRi , where
χRi is the indicator variable of Ri, which is 1 if Ri holds and 0 otherwise. To
see why the correctness frequency equals α (except on a zero-probability event),
observe that, for every value α of α, it is true that conditional on α = α the correct
voting events are independent with equal probabilities Pr(Ri |α) = α, so that by
the law of large numbers the correctness frequency 1n
∑n
i=1 χRi converges to α with
probability one.25
This observation about α implies that our Jury Theorem For Interchangeable
Voters can be re-stated without invoking de Finetti’s Theorem, namely by
25 The more formal argument goes as follows. The correctness frequency – call it β – is
defined as limn→∞ 1n
∑n
i=1 χRi , where in the event that
1
n
∑n
i=1 χRi does not converge
β is defined arbitrarily (this event has zero probability under Voter Interchangeability,
as will turn out in a moment). Now assume Voter Interchangeability and consider the
random variable α obtained in de Finetti’s Theorem. Then β equals α (outside a zero-
probability event) for the following reason. It suffices to show that E(|β − α|) = 0. We
have Pr(β = α|α) = 1 by the law-of-large-numbers argument given in the main text.
So, E(|β − α||α) = 0. Hence, E(|β − α|) = E(E(|β − α||α)) = E(0) = 0, as required. The
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replacing ‘the random variable α obtained in de Finetti’s Theorem’ by ‘the
correctness frequency α’. The theorem then states as follows (where the only
modified part is put in italics):26
Jury Theorem For Interchangeable Voters. Suppose Voter Interchangeability
holds and the correctness frequency α tends to exceed 12 . As the group size increases,
the probability that a majority votes correctly (i) increases, and (ii) converges to a
value which is less than one if Pr(α > 12 ) = 1 (and one if Pr(α > 12 ) = 1).
B. THE CAUSAL FOUNDATIONS OF NEW INDEPENDENCE
We here introduce causal network terminology more precisely, and give sufficient
conditions on causal interconnections for New Independence, citing a result to
be proved in a more technical follow-up paper. Mathematically, this appendix
is independent of the main text; it uses a different, explicitly network-theoretic
model in order to give foundations for New Independence. In this appendix, causal
relations are part of the formal setup, and the problem π is not a primitive but is
defined as the complex random variable consisting of all common causes of votes
plus the state x (if not already a common cause). In this setup, we give a formal
justification of New Independence in the form of a theorem which derives, rather
than assumes, New Independence, based on plausible conditions on the causal
relations, which are met in Figures 1–3 and in many other causal networks.
In a causal network, a variable a is said to be a direct cause of another b (and
b a direct effect of a) if there is an arrow pointing from a to b (‘a → b’). Further,
a is a cause of b (and b an effect of a) if there is a directed path from a to b, i.e. a
sequence of variables starting with a and ending with b such that each of these
variables (except from the last one) directly causes the next one. A variable is a
common cause (effect) of some variables if it is a cause (effect) of each of them. A
variable is a private cause of a vote if it is a cause of this vote but of no other votes.
The following can be proved:
Theorem (informally stated). Suppose the votes v1, v2, . . . and the state x are part
of a causal network over these and any number of other random variables, and
suppose probabilities are compatible with these causal relations.27
(a) If no vote is a cause of any other vote, then the votes are independent
conditional on the set C of all common causes of some votes;
(b) If no vote is a cause of any other vote, and the state x is not a common effect
of any votes or private causes thereof,28 then the votes are also independent
conditional on the augmented set C ∪ {x} (i.e. New Independence holds with
the problem identified with this augmented set).
shown fact that Pr(β = α) = 1 also implies that the case in which β was defined arbitrarily
– i.e. in which 1n
∑n
i=1 χRi does not converge – is a zero-probability event.
26 Also this re-stated theorem holds in the three variants.
27 Compatibility means that any variable is independent of its non-effects conditional on its
direct causes. This requirement is called the Parental Markov Condition.
28 In other words, the state x is not a common effect of variables each of which is or privately
causes a different vote.
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FIGURE 6. Violations of New Independence.
Many different causal networks, such as those in Figures 1–3, meet the
conditions laid out in part (b) of the theorem. In such networks the votes are
independent conditional on the problem and New Independence holds. However,
some rather special causal setups violate the conditions of part (b), hence of New
Independence. We give three elementary examples in Figure 6. Note that votes
have no common causes in 6b and 6c, and have just x as a common cause in
6a, so that in all three cases the problem on which we conditionalize consists
of x alone. Therefore, New and Classical Independence here reduce to the same
condition, so that the figures are in fact counterexamples to both independence
conditions. In 6a, vote 1 influences vote 2. With such a direct causal connection
between the votes independence is clearly violated. In 6b, the votes cause the
state of the world, which is implausible. Such a network could arise if the state of
the world (the correct judgement) was simply defined as the majority judgement,
but this is incompatible with a procedure-independent notion of correctness as
usually assumed in epistemic conceptions of democracy. Again, independence is
violated.29
A more complicated case is displayed in Figure 6c. Here the state is the causal
product of two different private causes of votes. Independence would require
that the votes are independent conditional on the state. But this is not the case,
as we can see by considering the following interpretation of causal network 6c.
Suppose state x represents the fact of whether parties A and B will form a coalition.
Suppose, for simplicity, that A and B will form a coalition if and only if in each
party a majority of members supports forming the coalition. c1 represents the fact
of whether there is enough support in A, c2 of whether there is enough support in
B. Voter 1 is an expert for party A, and bases his prediction entirely on the mood
in party A (thus c1’s causal effect on v1), while voter 2 is an expert for party B and
bases her prediction only on the mood in B (thus c2’s causal effect on v2). Thus,
each voter votes that the coalition takes place just in case he or she thinks there
29 If Independence were true, then given that the state is 1 the event of voter 1 voting for 1
would be independent of the event that all other voters vote for 1. But these two events are
negatively correlated: Pr(v1 = 1|v2 = . . . = vn = 1, x = 1) < Pr(v1 = 1|x = 1). The reason
for this inequality is that the left hand side reduces to Pr(v1 = 1|v2 = . . . = vn = 1) (since
the event that v2 = . . . = vn = 1 implies that x = 1), which equals Pr(v1 = 1) (since the
votes are independent unconditionally), which in turn is smaller than Pr(v1 = 1|x = 1)
(since the events that v1 = 1 and that x = 1 are positively correlated because 1’s voting for
1 partially explains that x = 1).
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is enough support in the party studied. Imagine we know that the state is, say,
that the coalition does not take place. If Independence were true, then voter 1’s
vote could not tell us anything about voter 2’s vote. But voter 1’s vote can tell us
something: if voter 1 votes, say, for the coalition taking place, then voter 2 probably
votes the opposite, because voter 1’s vote indicates that party A is willing, and
hence (since the coalition does not take place) that party B refuses to coalesce,
which voter 2 will know.
The upshot of this discussion is that our New Independence assumption
will hold for most causal setups, but is violated when either there is a direct
causal relation between the votes, or the state is itself commonly caused by votes
or private causes thereof. This is not only a problem for New Independence –
Classical Independence is also violated under such circumstances.
C. PROOF OF OUR NEW JURY THEOREM
We now prove our New Jury Theorem (in all three variants mentioned in appendix
A). Two preliminary remarks are due. First, for simplicity we assume that the
set of possible problems, to be denoted , is countable (with each of its subsets
being measurable), and that every problem π ∈  occurs with positive probability:
Pr(π ) > 0. As a result, problem-specific competence has a discrete distribution
over [0, 1], supported by a finite set (as in Figure 4) or a countably infinite set.
Proofs without this restriction are available on request; they express expectations
using (Lebesgue) integrals instead of sums.
Second, some of the summations used below involve an apparently
uncountable number of terms (as in ‘
∑
p∈[0,1] . . .’). Nonetheless these sums are well-
defined because the number of non-zero terms is always countable (and because if
this number is countably infinite then the sum converges to a value that does not
depend on the order of summation).
We now turn to the proof. Suppose New Independence and New Competence
hold. The proof proceeds in four steps. Only the last step uses that problem-
specific competence tends to exceed 12 (and hence, only that step distinguishes
between the three versions of the theorem, i.e. the three possible definitions of
‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ given in appendix A).
Step 1. Fix any group size n in {1, 3, 5, . . .}. For any problem π ∈  consider
Pr(Mn|π ), the conditional probability that the number of correct votes exceeds
n
2 given the problem π . Given the problem π , this number is the sum of n
independent Bernoulli variables with parameter pπ (by New Independence and
New Competence). Hence this number follows a Binomial distribution with
parameters n and pπ , that is, takes each value m in {0, 1, . . . , n} with probability
n!
m!(n−m)! (p
π )n(1 − pπ )n−m, and more generally falls into each set of values S ⊆ Rwith
a probability of
Bn,pπ (S) :=
∑
m∈{0,1,...,n}∩S
n!
m!(n − m)! (p
π )m(1 − pπ )n−m.
To obtain the probability of a correct majority given π , we have to take S = ( n2 , n]:
Pr(Mn|π ) = Bn,pπ
((n
2
, n
])
.
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By averaging over all possible problems, we obtain the unconditional probability
that a majority is correct:
Pr(Mn) =
∑
π∈
Pr(Mn|π ) Pr(π ) =
∑
π∈
Bn,pπ
((n
2
, n
])
Pr(π ).
By partitioning the set of all problems  into subsets of problems with equal
voter competence p ∈ [0, 1], the summation ‘∑π∈’ becomes equivalent to a nested
summation ‘
∑
p∈[0,1]
∑
π∈:pπ=p’. Thereby we obtain that
Pr(Mn) =
∑
p∈[0,1]
Bn,p
((n
2
, n
]) ∑
π∈:pπ=p
Pr(π )
=
∑
p∈[0,1]
Bn,p
((n
2
, n
])
Pr(pπ = p).
We split the last expression into a sum S1+S2+S3, where S1, S2 and S3 are defined
by restricting the summation index p to values above, below, or equal to 12 ,
respectively. Specifically, S1 is given by
S1 =
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]
Bn,p
((n
2
, n
])
Pr(pπ = p).(4)
Next, S2 is given by
S2 =
∑
p∈[0, 12 )
Bn,p
((n
2
, n
])
Pr(pπ = p)
=
∑
p∈[0, 12 )
{
1 − Bn,p
([
0,
n
2
))}
Pr(pπ = p)
=
∑
p∈[0, 12 )
Pr(pπ = p) −
∑
p∈[0, 12 )
Bn,p
([
0,
n
2
))
Pr(pπ = p).
This expression is the difference of (i) a sum which reduces to Pr(pπ < 12 ), and (ii)
another sum which (through a change of variable from p to 1 − p) can be rewritten
as
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]Bn,1−p([0,
n
2 )) Pr(p
π = 1 − p). Here, Bn,1−p([0, n2 )) can in turn be rewritten
as Bn,p(( n2 , n]); the reason is that
Bn,1−p
([
0,
n
2
))
=
∑
m=0,..., n−12
n!
m!(n − m)! (1 − p)
m pn−m and
Bn,p
((n
2
, n
])
=
∑
m= n+12 ,...,n
n!
m!(n − m)! p
m(1 − p)n−m,
where the sums appearing on the right hand sides coincide, as is seen from a
change of variable from m to n − m. We have thus shown that
S2 = Pr
(
pπ <
1
2
)
−
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]
Bn,p
((n
2
, n
])
Pr(pπ = 1 − p).(5)
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 17 Jul 2014 IP address: 158.143.197.78
118 FRANZ DIETRICH AND KAI SPIEKERMANN
Finally, S3 is given by
S3 = Bn, 12
((n
2
, n
])
Pr
(
pπ = 1
2
)
.
Here, Bn, 12 ((
n
2 , n]) is, just as B([0,
n
2 )), equal to
1
2 because the binomial distribution
Bn, 12 is symmetric around its mean
n
2 . So,
S3 = 12 Pr
(
pπ = 1
2
)
.(6)
By adding expressions 4, 5 and 6, we obtain that
Pr(Mn) = S1 + S2 + S3 =
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]
Bn,p
((n
2
,n
])
	(p) + 
,(7)
where 	(p) and 
 are defined as follows:
	(p) = Pr(pπ = p) − Pr(pπ = 1 − p),

 = Pr
(
pπ <
1
2
)
+ 1
2
Pr
(
pπ = 1
2
)
.
Step 2. In this step we show that for fixed p ∈ ( 12 , 1] the binomial probability in 7,
Pn := Bn,p
((n
2
, n
])
,(8)
is weakly increasing in (odd) n, and strictly so if p = 1. This fact (which is of course
closely related to the non-asymptotic conclusion of the classical jury theorem)
follows from a recursion formula:
Pn+2 = Pn + (2p − 1)
(
n
n+1
2
)
[p(1 − p)] n+12 .(9)
Indeed, since 12 < p ≤ 1, the second term on the right hand side of 9 is non-
negative (and positive if p = 1), so that Pn+2 ≥ Pn (and Pn+2>Pn if p = 1).
While the recursion formula 9 appears in the literature (e.g. Grofman et al.
1983), we cannot find a published derivation; let us therefore mention a simple
combinatorial argument to its effect. We again conditionalize on a given problem
π ∈  and write p for the corresponding problem-specific competence pπ . Fix
any odd group size n (∈{1, 3, . . .}). Recall that Pn+2 is the (problem-conditional)
probability of the event Mn+2 that more than half of the first n + 2 votes is correct.
This event can be partitioned into two subevents: the subevent Mn+2\Mn that more
than half of the first n + 2 but fewer than half of the first n votes are correct,
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and the subevent Mn+2∩Mn that more than half of the first n + 2 and also more
than half of the first n votes are correct. We can therefore decompose Pn+2 into a
sum:
Pn+2 = Pr(Mn+2\Mn|π ) + Pr(Mn+2 ∩ Mn|π ) .
Here, the second term can in turn be rewritten as follows:
Pr(Mn+2 ∩ Mn|π ) = Pr(Mn|π ) − Pr(Mn\Mn+2|π ) = Pn − Pr(Mn\Mn+2|π ),
so that in summary
Pn+2 = Pn + Pr(Mn+2\Mn|π ) − Pr(Mn\Mn+2|π ).(10)
Now the event Mn+2\Mn implies that exactly n+12 of the first n votes (i.e. a narrow
majority) must be incorrect – which happens with probability
( n
n+1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1 − p) n+12
– while the next two votes must be correct – which happens with probability p2.
By multiplication we therefore obtain that
Pr(Mn+2\Mn|π ) =
(
n
n+1
2
)
p
n−1
2 (1 − p) n+12 p2
= p
(
n
n+1
2
)
[p(1 − p)] n+12 .(11)
Similarly, the event Mn\Mn+2 of a correct majority among the first n but not
among the first n + 2 votes implies that exactly n+12 of the first n votes (i.e. a
narrow majority) is correct – which has probability
( n
n+1
2
)
p
n+1
2 (1 − p) n−12 – while
the next two votes are incorrect – which has probability (1 − p)2. Thus, again by
multiplication,
Pr(Mn\Mn+2|π ) =
(
n
n+1
2
)
p
n+1
2 (1 − p) n−12 (1 − p)2
= (1 − p)
(
n
n+1
2
)
[p(1 − p)] n+12 .(12)
Using expressions 11 and 12, we see that equation 10 implies the recursion
formula 9.
Step 3. We now prove the theorem’s asymptotic conclusion. By Step 1 we
have to find the limit as n→∞ of the expression 7. We first show that the
subexpression Bn,p(( n2 , n]) (=Pn) converges to one as n→∞. Recall that this
expression is the probability that the sum of n independent and identically
distributed Bernoulli-variables (which are 1 with probability p) belongs to the
interval ( n2 ,n]. Equivalently, it is the probability that
1
n times this sum belongs to
the interval ( 12 , 1]. This probability converges to 1 as n → ∞, by the law of large
numbers and the fact that the interval ( 12 , 1] contains the mean p of each Bernoulli-
variable.
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By 7 and the just-shown fact that limn→∞ Bn,p(( n2 , n]) = 1,
Pr(Mn) →
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]
	(p) + 

=
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]
Pr(pπ = p) −
∑
p∈( 12 ,1]
Pr(pπ = 1 − p) + 

= Pr
(
pπ >
1
2
)
− Pr
(
pπ >
1
2
)
+ 

= Pr
(
pπ >
1
2
)
+ 1
2
Pr
(
pπ = 1
2
)
.
This limit is one if Pr(pπ > 12 ) = 1, and less than one otherwise.
Step 4. We finally show the theorem’s non-asymptotic conclusion by distinguishing
between the three variants of the theorem defined in Appendix A. (Although the
first variant follows from the second, we also give a simple direct proof of the first
variant.)
Variant (a). Here ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ is defined in our first (weak) way. By Step
1 we have to show that expression 7 is weakly increasing in (odd) group size n.
This follows from the fact that 
 is a constant in n, 	(p) is a non-negative constant
(by New Competence with the current definition of tendency to exceed 12 ), and
expression 8 is weakly increasing (by Step 2).
Variant (b). Here ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ is defined in our second way (i.e. as a weak
tendency to exceed 12 within (0, 1)). Noting that for p = 1 we have Bn,p(( n2 , n]) = 1,
expression 7 for the probability of majority correctness can be re-written as
Pr(Mn) =
∑
p∈( 12 ,1)
Bn,p
((n
2
,n
])
	(p) + 	(1) + 
.
Hence, since 
 and 	(1) are constant in n, it suffices to show that the expression∑
p∈( 12 ,1)Bn,p((
n
2 ,n])	(p) is weakly increasing (in odd n). This is the case because
for all p ∈ ( 12 , 1), firstly, the coefficient 	(p) is non-negative (by New Competence
with the current notion of ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’) and, secondly, the coefficient
Bn,p(( n2 ,n]) (=Pn) is strictly increasing by Step 2.
Variant (c). Here, ‘tendency to exceed 12 ’ is defined in our third way (i.e. as a
strict tendency to exceed 12 within (0, 1)). To show that the probability of majority
correctness is now even strictly increasing, we consider again the argument made
for variant (b) and add that for some p ∈ ( 12 , 1) the coefficient 	(p) is strictly
positive, so that the sum
∑
p∈( 12 ,1)Bn,p((
n
2 , n])	(p) becomes strictly increasing. 
